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The Challenges of Preventing and 
Prosecuting Social Media Crimes 
 
Thaddeus Hoffmeister* 
 
Wanted: Caretaker For Farm. Simply watch over 
a 688 acre patch of hilly farmland and feed a few 
cows, you get 300 a week and a nice 2 bedroom 
trailer, someone older and single preferred but 
will consider all, relocation a must, you must 
have a clean record and be trustworthy—this is a 
permanent position, the farm is used mainly as a 
hunting preserve, is overrun with game, has a 
stocked 3 acre pond, but some beef cattle will be 
kept, nearest neighbor is a mile away, the place 
is secluded and beautiful, it will be a real get 
away for the right person, job of a lifetime—if 
you are ready to relocate please contact asap, 
position will not stay open.1 
 
This Craigslist ad was posted in 2011 by two residents of 
North-Central Ohio, Brogan Rafferty (age 16 at the time) and 
Richard Beasley (age 52 at the time).2  Of the four individuals 
(2 from within Ohio and 2 from outside of Ohio) who came to 
the farm to interview for this job posting, 3 were killed and 
robbed by Rafferty and Beasley.3  The fourth victim was shot 
but managed to escape and contact authorities.4  Both Rafferty 
 
* Professor of Law and editor of lawandsocialmedia.wordpress.com. 
1. Hanna Rosin, Murder by Craigslist: A Serial Killer Finds a Newly 
Vulnerable Class of Victims: White, Working Class Men, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 
2013, 8:20 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/advertisement-for-
murder/309435/. 
2. Thomas J. Sheeran, Richard Beasley, ‘Craigslist Killer,’ Sentenced to 
Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 4, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/04/richard-beasley-craigslist-killer-
death-penalty-sentence_n_3013536.html#. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
1
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and Beasley were apprehended, tried, and convicted.5  Rafferty 
was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and 
Beasley is currently on Ohio’s Death Row.6 
For those bent on committing crimes, like Rafferty and 
Beasley, social media has opened up a whole new world.  It has 
become the place where criminal defendants not only commit 
crimes, but also organize, plan, discuss, and even boast about 
their illegal activity.  Numerous criminal defendants ranging 
from Fortune 500 corporate officers to street level petty thieves 
have used social media to facilitate their criminal conduct.  
Social media has even garnered the attention of criminal 
gangs.7  This in turn has led commentators to coin new phrases 
and terms like “cyberbanging.”8 
The adoption and use of social media by a broad spectrum 
of criminal defendants has raised some significant challenges 
for those tasked with crime prevention.  This article will look at 
those challenges through the lens of three cases involving 
social media: United States v. Drew,9 United States v. Sayer,10 
and United States v. Cassidy.11  However, prior to beginning 
that examination, this article will briefly discuss and categorize 
the various ways criminal defendants employ social media. 
 
I.      Categorizing Criminal Activity Involving Social Media 
 
Generally speaking, criminal defendants use social media 
in one of two ways.  The first method by which criminal 
defendants employ social media involves relaying information 
to victims,12 co-conspirators,13 or the general public.14  Conduct 
 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Kim Russell, Detroit Students Organize Fights Online and Then Post 
Videos in Practice Called Cyber-Banging, ABC ACTION NEWS (Jan. 28, 2012, 
11:37 PM), http://www.wxyz.com/news/region/detroit/detroit-public-schools-
police-fighting-cyber-banging. 
8. Id. 
9. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
10. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014). 
11. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011). 
12. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449. 
13. Andrew Blankstein & Kimi Yoshino, The Game’s ‘Telephone Flash 
Mob’ Delayed Responses to Robberies, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2011), 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/4
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arising here is classified as Category I activity.  This category 
can be further subdivided into two distinct groups (A and B).  
Group A consists of criminal conduct that occurs entirely online 
for example bullying, harassment, or stalking.15 
Group B consists of criminal activity that occurs both 
online and offline.16  The previously mentioned example from 
Ohio where the criminal defendants used Craigslist to lure 
victims to their farm and then execute them would fall into 
Group B.17 
The common denominator with both groups in Category I 
is that the criminal defendant uses social media to relay 
information to victims, co-conspirators, or the general public.  
The term relay applies to any method by which an individual 
may deliver information to another via social media.  This 
includes such things as “liking” the social media content of 
another user.18  In one case from New York, a trial court 
determined that a defendant could be charged for violating a 
protection order when she sent a friend request to an 
individual who had a protection order against her.19  According 
to the judge, the defendant’s use of social media to reach the 
complainant was a form of contact just like speaking in person 
or by telephone, and the order of restraint had barred any type 
of contact.20 
When relaying information to victims, co-defendants, or 
the general public, criminal defendants use a variety of 
techniques.  For example, some communicate directly with the 
victim on social media, while others communicate indirectly by 
merely posting information on social media in a public or quasi-
public place where the victims or the public can view it.  For 
example, in Griffin v. Maryland, a case involving the 
authentication of a Myspace page, the girlfriend of the 
 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/08/game-rapper-twitter-
telephone-flash-mob-sheriff.html. 
14. Sayer, 748 F.3d at 425. 
15. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449. 
16. Sheeran, supra note 2. 
17. Id. 
18. Tennessee Man Arrested for Facebook Like, RT (Jan. 17, 2011), 
http://rt.com/usa/man-arrested-facebook-like-790/.  
19. People v. Fernino, 851 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Crim. Ct. 2008). 
20. Id. 
3
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defendant allegedly posted the following on her Myspace page 
as a warning to anyone who planned to testify against her 
boyfriend in his upcoming trial, “JUST REMEMBER 
SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”21 
Also, when relaying information to victims, co-defendants, 
or the general public, some criminal defendants use their real 
names.22  Others remain anonymous or create fictitious 
names.23  A final group actually creates a false name or takes 
on the identity of the intended victim, e.g., online 
impersonation.24 
The second method or category of criminal activity involves 
using social media to gather information about victims.25  Like 
Category I, Category II can be further subdivided into two 
groups.  In Group A, the criminal defendant employs the 
information gathered from social media to commit modern 
crimes that many associate with the Internet, e.g., identity 
theft.26  In Group B, the criminal defendant uses information 
gathered from social media to commit traditional crimes such 
as burglary.27 
When using social media for Category II crimes, criminal 
defendants look for all types of personal identifiable 
information about victims ranging from photos to birthdates to 
names of friends. According to Frank Abagnale, a former con 
man turned FBI officer (portrayed in the 2002 film Catch Me If 
 
21. Griffin v. Maryland, 995 A.2d 791, 795 (Md. 2011). 
22. United States v. Elonis, No. 11-00013, 2011 WL 5024284 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 20, 2011). 
23. A.B. v. Indiana, 863 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), vacated, 885 
N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 
502 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
24. Tina Susman, Facebook Identity Theft: Probation Deal for Woman 
Who Trashed Ex?, LA TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/20/nation/la-na-nn-fake-facebook-
20120320. 
25. Facebook ID Theft Targets “Friends”, NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2009), 
http://bob-sullivan.newsvine.com/_news/2009/01/30/2375283-facebook-id-
theft-targets-friends. 
26. Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/technology/17privacy.html?_r=0. 
27. Kim Komando, Burglars Use Social Media to Target Homes, USA 
TODAY (Jan. 3, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/komando/2014/01/03/social-
media-identity-theft-home-videos/4248601/. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/4
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You Can), “[i]f you tell me your date of birth and where you’re 
born [on Facebook], I’m 98% [of the way] to stealing your 
identity.”28 
To obtain certain personal information, criminal 
defendants must monitor social media over a period of time.29  
This is especially true if the criminal defendant wants to learn 
the physical whereabouts or daily routine of the victim.30 
Currently, the vast majority of social media related 
criminal activity occurs in Category I, i.e., relaying information 
to others.  Thus, this essay will focus on this category.  It 
should be noted, however, that sometimes the defendant’s 
criminal conduct falls into both Categories I and II or cuts 
across multiple groups. 
 
II. United States v. Lori Drew 
 
In United States v. Lori Drew, the defendant, a 49-year-old 
mother from Missouri, created a MySpace page with the 
picture of an attractive fictitious 16-year-old boy named Josh 
Evans.31  The picture used for the MySpace page was of a real 
person, however, the name and information attached to the 
picture were entirely fake.32  Lori Drew created this account to 
befriend 13-year-old Megan Meier, a one-time friend and 
classmate of Drew’s daughter.33  Lori Drew believed that this 
bogus MySpace account would allow her to learn whether 
Megan Meier was spreading rumors about her daughter.34 
Acting as Josh Evans, Lori Drew would flirt with Megan 
 
28. Mark Sweney, Facebook Users Risk Identity Theft, Says Famous Ex-
Conman, GUARDIAN (London), (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/mar/20/facebook-risks-identity-
theft-frank-abagnale. 
29. Simon Tomlinson, How’s Your Social Security? Burglars Monitor 
Facebook and Twitter to See When You’re Away from Home, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 
1, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2056079/Hows-social-
security-Burglars-monitor-Facebook-Twitter-youre-away-home.html. 
30. Id. 
31. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
5
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Meier on MySpace.35  The relationship eventually turned sour 
and Lori Drew, through Josh Evans, told Megan Meier that the 
world would be a better place without her.36  Shortly thereafter, 
Megan Meier, believing she had been rejected by Josh Evans 
committed suicide in her closet bedroom.37 
The federal government relying on the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (CFAA) charged Lori Drew with three felony 
counts of accessing protected computers without authorization 
to obtain information.38  At the time, the CFAA appeared to be 
the best federal statute to address Lori Drew’s conduct. The 
U.S. attorney from the Central District of California handled 
the prosecution because the MySpace servers were physically 
located in California.  Missouri passed on the opportunity to 
prosecute because at the time the state’s harassment statute 
did not address Lori Drew’s conduct.39 
Under the government’s theory of prosecution, Lori Drew 
violated the CFAA because she had entered into a contract or 
Terms of Service (TOS) agreement with MySpace in order to 
create Josh Evans’s account.40  Most social media providers 
require users to enter into a TOS established by the social 
media provider prior to setting up an account.41  Pursuant to 
the MySpace TOS, Lori Drew was required to provide accurate 
and truthful information when registering for the account and 
refrain from using any information obtained from MySpace 
services to harass, abuse, or harm other people.42 
Lori Drew allegedly violated this TOS when she (1) created 
the bogus Josh Evans account and (2) used the account to 
harass Megan Meier.43  Thus, Lori Drew’s communication with 
Megan Meier through MySpace’s protected servers was without 
authorization or in excess of authorized access at least 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2012) (emphasis added). 
39. Joel Currier & David Hunn, Neighbor’s Story Emerges in Suicide; 
Prosecutor Finds Insufficient Evidence to Charge Anyone in MySpace Case, 
ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 2007, at A1. 
40. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464-68. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/4
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according to the prosecution.44 
Although the jury found Lori Drew guilty, it rejected the 
prosecution’s theory that Lori Drew intended to harm Megan 
Meier, a required finding for a felony conviction under the 
CFAA.45  As a result, the jury only convicted Lori Drew of three 
misdemeanor counts.46  These convictions were later 
overturned by the trial judge on vagueness grounds.47  The trial 
judge determined that the CFAA as applied in the Drew case 
failed to give the defendant notice that breach of a website’s 
TOS in and of itself could constitute a crime.48  In addition, the 
judge found that such application provided insufficient 
guidelines to law enforcement as they attempt to enforce the 
law.49 
While Lori Drew’s conduct was universally condemned 
across the country, many felt uncomfortable with her 
prosecution under the CFAA.50  The concern over the case was 
not necessarily for Lori Drew but what her case meant for 
future defendants.  Had the government succeeded in its 
prosecution of Lori Drew, then arguably anyone could be 
prosecuted for violating a TOS.  Thus, lying on Myspace or 
LinkedIn about academic or professional credentials in order to 
impress some reader could lead to criminal charges if the social 
media provider’s TOS prohibited such dishonesty or fraud. 
 
III.      United States v. Sayer 
 
Sayer illustrates another example of online social media 
impersonation; however, unlike Drew, the defendant here 
impersonated the victim (his ex-girlfriend) rather than a 
fictitious person.51  In Sayer, the defendant posted ads on 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 451. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 449. 
48. Id. at 461. 
49. Id. at 467. 
50. Andrew M. Grossman, The MySpace Suicide: A Case Study in 
Overcriminalization, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sep. 17, 2008), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/09/the-myspace-suicide-a-case-
study-in-overcriminalization. 
51. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 2014). 
7
  
122 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
Craiglist’s Casual Encounters (a section on Craigslist for 
meeting other people) that showed his ex-girlfriend in 
lingerie.52  Prior to their break-up, the defendant had taken 
consensual photos of the victim.53  In the ad, Sayer, posing as 
his ex-girlfriend, encouraged men to come to her house.54  The 
ad included the victim’s address and a list of sex acts to be 
performed when the men arrived.55  As a result of the ad, 
strange men would routinely appear at the victim’s house 
looking for sexual encounters.56 
In order to prevent random strangers from showing up at 
her house, the victim moved to Louisiana.57  However, different 
men again started to arrive at her new home.58  Like in the 
past, these men claimed that they had met the victim online.59  
Shortly thereafter, the victim discovered a sexually explicit 
video of herself on several adult pornographic sites.60  As with 
the earlier pictures, the victim had consented to the video prior 
to her breakup with Sayer.61  The video posting included the 
victim’s name as well as her new Louisiana address.62  
Ultimately, Sayer was caught and successfully prosecuted for 
cyber stalking and identity theft.63 
With respect to the cyber stalking charge, Sayer was 
convicted of violating the Federal Interstate Stalking 
Punishment and Prevention Act (FISPPA).64  While the term 
“Facebook Stalker” has garnered a sort of benign humorous 
connotation in popular culture,65 individuals, through the 
misuse of social media, have been charged and convicted of 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 429. 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012). 
65. Byron Dubow, Confessions of ‘Facebook Stalkers’, USA TODAY (Mar. 
8, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2007-03-
07-facebook-stalking_N.htm. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/4
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violating FISPPA.  As originally written, FISPPA prohibited a 
person, who had crossed state lines, from using the mail or 
commerce to put another in reasonable fear of death or serious 
injury.66  In 2000, the jurisdictional hook of the statute was 
changed from “travel across a State line” to “travel[] in 
interstate commerce.”67  This modification turned FISPPA into 
a statute that targeted both traditional and online stalking.68  
The law was again expanded in 2006 to criminalize causing 
substantial emotional distress to another person using an 
interactive computer service.69  Today, for a successful 
prosecution under FISPPA, the government must prove the 
following elements: 
 
Use of 
a.     The mail 
b.     Any interactive computer 
service, or 
c.     Any facility of interstate or 
foreign commerce; 
To engage in a course of conduct, 
defined as a pattern of conduct 
composed of 2 or more acts, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose; 
That causes 
d.       Substantial emotional distress, 
or 
e.       Reasonable fear of death or 
serious bodily injury, to a person in 
another state or tribal jurisdiction or 
within the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction; and 
Intent by the defendant to 
f.        Kill, 
g.        Injure, 
h.        Harass, 
 
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A Notes. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 
9
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i.          Place under surveillance with 
intent  to kill, injure, harass, or 
intimidate, or 
j.          Cause substantial emotional 
distress to that person.70 
 
IV. United States v. Cassidy 
 
United States v. Cassidy, the last case to be discussed, 
highlights some of the challenges that arise with FISPPA 
prosecutions when the alleged stalking or harassment involves 
a public figure and occurs on social media.  In Cassidy, the 
criminal defendant, who initially went by the alias Sanderson, 
met Alyce Zeoli in 2007.71  Zeoli, an enthroned Buddhist 
American tulku,72 teaches and leads the Kunzang Odsal Palyou 
Changchub Choling Center (“Center”), located in Maryland.73  
The meeting between Cassidy and Zeoli was facilitated by 
Zeoli’s friends who believed that Cassidy was also a Buddhist 
American tulku.74 
After meeting and becoming fast friends with Cassidy, 
Zeoli invited him to drive with her to a retreat in Arizona.75  
During the trip, Cassidy proposed to Zeoli but she declined his 
offer.76  He then suggested that the two pretend to be 
married.77  While on this trip, Zeoli also revealed intimate 
details about her personal life to Cassidy.78 
Shortly after the trip, it came to light that William 
Sanderson’s real name was William Cassidy.79  Members of the 
Center also began to notice that Cassidy’s conduct was 
inconsistent with the sect’s teachings, e.g., he gossiped.80  Yet, 
 
70. Id. 
71. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 578 (D. Md. 2011). 
72. Id. (A tulku is "A reincarnate master."). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/4
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despite certain misgivings, Cassidy was appointed to the 
position of chief operating officer (COO) of the Center.81  
Shortly after his appointment as COO, Zeoli learned that 
Cassidy had never been a tulku.82  She confronted Cassidy 
about this fact and he left the Center in February 2008.83 
Subsequent to his departure, Cassidy started making 
disparaging posts and tweets about Zeoli and the Center. Some 
of the 8,000 tweets and blog posts were arguably threatening: 
 
ya like haiku? Here’s one for ya: “Long, Limb, 
Sharp Saw, Hard Drop” ROFLMAO. 
Got a wonderful Pearl Harbor Day surprise for 
KPC . . . wait for it. 
Terrors in the night disturb Fat (A.Z.)’s sleep: she 
cannot sleep without taking something, and 
anxiety rules her body like a slavemaster.84 
 
Other tweets and posts were critical and disparaging: 
 
[Zeoli] is a demonic force who tries to destroy 
Buddhism. 
(A.Z.) you are a liar & a fraud & you corrupt 
Buddhism by your very presence: go kill yourself. 
(A.Z.) IS A SATANIC CORRUPTER OF 
DHARMA: A SHE_DEMON WHO 
MASQUERADES AS A “TEACHER”85 
 
In 2011, Cassidy was charged with violating FISPPA.86  
Specifically, Cassidy was charged with the intent to harass and 
cause substantial emotional distress to Zeoli in violation of 
FISPPA.87 Interestingly, the government did not charge the 
defendant with putting Zeoli in reasonable fear of death or 
 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 588. 
85. Id. at 589. 
86. Id. at 576. 
87. Id. 
11
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serious bodily injury.  This is most likely due to the fact that 
the posts and tweets, although disparaging, were not very 
threatening. 
Prior to trial, counsel for Cassidy filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that the statute on its face and as applied violated 
Cassidy’s First Amendment rights.88  The trial court ultimately 
found the statute unconstitutional as applied to Cassidy.89  
Thus, it never decided whether the statute was 
unconstitutional on its face. 
In dismissing the charges against Cassidy, the trial court 
first determined that Cassidy’s tweets and blog posts, although 
in bad taste, challenged Zeoli’s character and qualifications as 
a religious leader and thus were protected under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.90  The court 
pointed out that not all speech is protected, for example, speech 
involving obscenity, fraud, defamation, true threats, 
incitement, or speech integral to criminal conduct.91  However, 
Cassidy was charged with harassing Zeoli, not with placing her 
in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. 
The next step in the court’s analysis was to determine 
whether FISPPA as applied to Cassidy’s actions was a content-
based restriction.92  The court ultimately determined that the 
statute as applied to Cassidy was a content-based restriction 
because it “limits speech on the basis of whether that speech is 
emotionally distressing to A.Z.”93 
As a result of this determination, the court examined the 
application of the FISPPA statute under the highest level of 
review—strict scrutiny.94  Thus, in order for the government to 
prevail against Cassidy’s motion to dismiss, it had to show a 
compelling interest for the prosecution of the case, a very high 
standard to meet. 
The government claimed that its compelling interest arose 
from the need to protect “victims from emotional distress 
 
88. Id. at 581. 
89. Id. at 587. 
90. Id. at 583. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 584. 
94. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/4
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sustained through an interactive computer service.”95  The 
court pointed out, however, that this interest could just as 
easily be protected by having the victim ignore the defendant’s 
blog or block his tweets.96 
The court then went on to examine whether the 
government could survive the defendant’s motion to suppress 
under a lower level of review—intermediate scrutiny.97  
Unfortunately for the prosecution, the court again found the 
government’s argument for prosecuting Cassidy under FISPPA 
unconstitutional even with this lower level of scrutiny.98  Here, 
the court drew a distinction between using the telephone to 
harass someone and using Twitter or a blog.99  In explaining 
why Virginia’s telephone harassment statute could be found 
constitutional while FISPPA as applied to Cassidy could not, 
the court stated, “harassing telephone calls ‘are targeted 
towards a particular victim and are received outside a public 
forum’. . . Twitter and Blogs are today’s equivalent of a bulletin 
board that one is free to disregard, in contrast, for example, to 
e-mails or phone calls directed to a victim.”100 
The court’s opinion did not end with finding the 
government’s interest to be lacking at both levels of scrutiny.  
The court went on and assumed in arguendo that the 
government had a compelling interest.101  The court still found 
the indictment as applied to Cassidy unconstitutional because 
FISPPA, in this case, “sweeps in the type of expression that the 
Supreme Court has consistently tried to protect.”102  For 
example, the statute could cover statements Cassidy made 
about “KPC’s beliefs and A.Z.’s qualifications as a leader.”103 
Cassidy might have resulted in a better outcome for the 
government if the defendant, rather than using social media, 
had employed traditional communication methods like the mail 
 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 585. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 587. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 585. 
101. Id. at 586 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
13
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or the telephone.  The court appeared troubled with 
prosecuting someone for making disparaging comments about a 
public figure in a public forum.  The court noted “that Twitter 
and Blogs are today’s equivalent of a bulletin board that one is 
free to disregard, in contrast, for example, to e-mails or phone 
calls directed at the victim.”104  The court went on to find that a 
blog is similar to a cyberspace bulletin board.105 
The government also might have survived the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss by changing its theory of prosecution from 
causing emotional distress to issuing true threats.106  As the 
court pointed out, true threats like obscenity, fraud, 
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct are not 
protected speech;107 however, that was not the basis for the 
government’s indictment in this case.  According to the court, 
“the Government did not seek an Indictment on the basis that 
the Defendant intentionally used the Internet to put A.Z. in 
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.”108 
 
V. Challenges of Preventing and Prosecuting Social Media 
Crimes 
 
At present, many think that social media crimes are easier 
to commit and more difficult to prevent than their offline 
counterparts.109  For example, in the past, a crime like 
harassment generally required a criminal defendant to interact 
physically or telephonically with the victim.  Furthermore, 
criminal defendants were historically constrained by the 
volume of their voices and the physical proximity of the victim.  
Harrasers in the Digital Age do not face these same type of 
impediments. 
As illustrated by Sayer, harassment can now occur without 
the criminal defendant ever speaking to or interacting with the 
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105. Id. 
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victim.110  In fact, the criminal defendant does not even need to 
leave his house to commit the crime.  Nor does it matter if the 
victim moves away because he or she can be easily tracked 
down by their Digital Footprint.111  Also, with social media the 
criminal defendant can harass the victim through third parties 
who may or may not know that they are part of a criminal 
enterprise. 
The next section will examine some of the major challenges 
that arise when attempting to prevent and prosecute social 
media related criminal activity.  Specifically, this section will 
focus on the (1) reach of social media; (2) identification of social 
media users; and (3) applicable criminal statutes. 
 
A. Reach of Social Media 
 
With social media and its expansive reach (Facebook alone 
has over 1.2 billion users),112 the pool of potential victims for 
criminal defendants has grown exponentially.  In the example 
of the so-called Ohio “Craigslist Killers” the criminal 
defendants were able to go beyond their own immediate 
physical surroundings and find victims both inside and outside 
of the state.113  One victim travelled all the way from South 
Carolina in response to the job advertisement.114  By 
victimizing individuals from various areas of the country, the 
defendants reduced the likelihood that the victims would be 
traced back to them or that their scheme would be uncovered.  
The reach of social media was also seen in Sayer where, despite 
moving far away, the victim was still being harassed by her ex-
 
110. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014). 
111. Cf. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: 
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Billion Users, GUARDIAN (London) (Feb. 3, 2014), 
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zuckerberg. 
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Vulnerable Class of Victims: White, Working Class Men, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 
2013, 8:20 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/advertisement-for-
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boyfriend.115 
Since criminal defendants can easily reach victims via 
social media, they are more inclined to repeat their crimes.  In 
Sayer, the criminal defendant used Craigslist’s Casual 
Encounters site to re-victimize his ex-girlfriend.116  The 
criminal defendant in Cassidy made over 8,000 disparaging 
blog posts and tweets about Alyce Zeoli and the Center.117  
With social media, criminal defendants can harm victims 
rapidly and repeatedly. 
 
B. Identification of Social Media Users 
 
One of the biggest challenges with preventing and 
prosecuting social media related crimes is identification of 
users.  This is true both for victims and law enforcement.  To 
date, neither social media providers nor the government has 
established a cost-effective method to verify social media users.  
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that society wants either 
the government or social media providers to have this ability.  
As a result, it is not difficult for criminal defendants to remain 
anonymous or impersonate others on social media.  Last year, 
Facebook reported that 7–8 percent of its accounts or 
approximately 50 million were fictitious.118 
In Drew, Megan Meier did not know that she was 
communicating with a middle-aged woman and in Sayer the 
men visiting Sayer’s ex-girlfriend were unaware of the fact that 
it was actually Sayer posting the ads.  This all raises an 
interesting question of why impersonation works so well on 
social media.  It appears that the success of online 
impersonation hinges on social media’s ability to replicate 
human interaction.  Unlike traditional forms of communication 
such as the mail, telephone, or television, social media comes 
very close to approximating face-to-face contact.  This in turn 
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leads users to believe that the individual at the other end of the 
laptop, tablet, or smartphone is who she says she is. 
Another reason online impersonations are successful is 
that social media has reshaped the nature of relationships.  
This started with re-defining the word “friend.”  With social 
media, users create friendships online with people that they do 
not really know in the traditional sense; that is, most people 
who use social media have not interacted with (beyond 
accepting a friend request) or physically met all of their online 
friends.  This in turn leads to a breakdown of the traditional 
social barriers that kept strangers apart.  This reshaping of 
human interaction has progressed to the point where 
individuals have “dating” relationships completely online.  
While this is more common with Digital Natives,119 see e.g., 
Mant’i Teo,120 it is not unheard of with Digital Immigrants.121  
In fact, there was even a documentary film (Catfish) dedicated 
to exploring these relationships.122 
 
C. Applicable Criminal Statutes 
 
The third major challenge to combatting social media 
related crime concerns the availability of applicable criminal 
statutes.  In certain instances, legislators have failed to keep 
pace with technological advancements.  For instance, while 
identity theft is a recognized crime in every state,123 the same 
cannot be said for online impersonation.124  Unlike identity 
theft, online impersonation, generally speaking, lacks an 
economic component.  Instead, the criminal defendant 
impersonates an individual for a noneconomic reason such as 
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123. Susan Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of 
Criminal Law in Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 73 
(2009). 
124. WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-3-902 (West 2011); S. 4014, 2011, 235 Sess. (NY 
2012). 
17
  
132 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
to harass.125  To date, few states have passed laws directly 
targeting online impersonation.126 
In other instances, there is a law in place but it is not 
directly on point. This in turn leads some prosecutors to get 
creative which, can make the problem worse.  The Drew case 
serves as a shining example. 
In Drew, the state of Missouri declined to prosecute Lori 
Drew because the Missouri criminal harassment statute did 
not cover her specific conduct.127  Missouri’s harassment 
statute has been modified since then.128  Missouri’s inaction led 
the federal government to action.  However, like the state of 
Missouri, the federal government did not have a law that 
directly addressed Lori Drew’s conduct.  This in turn led them 
to try and shoehorn the facts of the Drew case into the 
CFAA,129 which created a backlash as many then saw Drew’s 
prosecution as an encroachment on the constitutional rights of 
society as a whole.130 
Finally, there are instances where there is an available 
and appropriate law in place, but when applied to social media 
rather than traditional forms of communication it is deemed 
unconstitutional.  This is what occurred in Cassidy where the 
court dismissed the government’s indictment, finding that it 
infringed on the criminal defendant’s First Amendment 
rights.131  A key issue in Cassidy was the method used by the 
defendant to communicate his views.132  The court made note of 
the fact that rather than use the phone or email to make 
disparaging comments directly to the victim, the defendant 
used public forums such as Twitter and blog posts.133  The court 
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went on to compare these social media platforms to bulletin 
boards that the victim had the option of reading.134  The court 
was extremely concerned about prohibiting private individuals 
from using social media to criticize and disparage others, 
especially public figures.135 
One take away from Cassidy is that prosecutors and 
legislators will have a more difficult time preventing 
harassment via a public forum like Twitter or a blog post as 
opposed to harassment via a telephone call, letter, or email.  
Put differently, one-to-many speech, which generally 
encompasses social media, is going to face tougher 
constitutional scrutiny than one-to-one speech like a telephone 
call, letter, or email. 
Due to time and space limitations, this article cannot offer 
a complete analysis of all the challenges facing those tasked 
with preventing and prosecuting social media related criminal 
activity.  However, that was not the purpose of the article.  
Instead, the intent was merely to offer a brief snapshot of some 
of the major concerns that have arisen in this area of law. 
As the cases and prior discussion demonstrate, stopping 
social media related crimes is no easy task.  In fact, it appears, 
at present, that criminal defendants have the upper hand.  
Fortunately, this advantage will most likely be short-lived.  
This is because law enforcement has been steadily adapting to 
the Digital Age and incorporating social media into every 
aspect of policing.  For example, agencies from the New York 
City Police Department to the Florida Fish and Wildlife 
Conservation Commission have established their very own 
social media units or dedicated personnel to investigate and 
monitor social media.136 
Furthermore, legislators and prosecutors are now taking 
proactive steps to prevent criminal defendants from exploiting 
social media for criminal purposes.  By way of example, several 
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states have passed laws banning certain criminal defendants 
from social media.137  Also, many prosecutors are now routinely 
using social media in their cases.  According to one Los Angeles 
district attorney, “the first thing I do when I get a case is to 
Google the victim, the suspect, and all the material witnesses. I 
run them all through Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, YouTube 
and see what I might get.”138 
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